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________________
OPINION
________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
*

The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge
for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
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This civil-rights case was filed after law enforcement
officers shot and killed a suspected car thief during a standoff.
Immediately prior to the shooting, the suspect had been
standing with his right hand concealed in his waistband and
appeared to be clutching an object. After being ordered both
to show his hands and to freeze, the suspect suddenly pulled
his right hand out of his waistband—not as if he were
surrendering—but as though he were drawing a gun. The
sudden movement prompted the officers to open fire, leading
to the suspect’s death. The officers fired their guns for 10
solid seconds, shooting a total of 39 rounds. Eighteen bullets
hit the suspect, 11 of them from behind. It turned out that the
suspect was not clutching a weapon; he was holding a crack
pipe.
The administrator of the suspect’s estate filed this suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the officers’ use of
force was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment.
In due course, the District Court granted a defense motion for
summary judgment, holding that the officers acted reasonably
as a matter of law. To the extent that the District Court held
that the suspect’s abrupt, threatening movement justified the
officers’ initial use of deadly force, we agree. However, we
conclude that a jury should decide whether the force became
unreasonable some time thereafter—i.e., whether the officers
should have ceased firing their weapons before they did.
Accordingly, we will affirm in part and reverse in part.
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I1
The events surrounding the deadly shooting took place
shortly after 10:00 p.m. on July 21, 2003. New Jersey State
Troopers Christopher Modarelli, Mark Manzo, Keith Moyer,
Joseph Carson, and Thomas Hollywood were at the Bellmawr
State Police Station when the radio dispatcher reported that
local police were in pursuit of a stolen vehicle on Interstate
295 near Route 30. The location is within the Bellmawr
station’s jurisdiction, so the troopers drove out to the scene.
When they arrived, they were advised that the suspect, a
white male wearing a white t-shirt, dark sweat pants, and no
shoes, had abandoned the vehicle and fled into the woods
bordering the interstate. They were also told that local police
officer Robert Swanson had gone after him. Modarelli,
Moyer, Manzo, and Carson went into the woods to provide
backup for Swanson. Hollywood stayed behind.
The woods were dark and dense. The officers needed
their flashlights just to see in front of them. At one point,
Modarelli stumbled upon the suspect who was hiding under
some brush. Modarelli ordered him to show his hands and
surrender, but the suspect disregarded the commands and ran
away. Modarelli, now joined by Moyer, followed after him.
During the chase, the suspect got caught in a thicket.
1

As we must, we recount the facts and draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the party who
opposed summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378
(2007).
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Trapped, he turned and faced Modarelli and Moyer, who
drew their guns. Modarelli and Moyer shouted, “Don’t make
me shoot you,” and (inconsistently) ordered the suspect to
show his hands and to freeze. Swanson, Carson, and Manzo
heard the commotion and joined Modarelli and Moyer.
Manzo unholstered his gun.
The officers were standing between five and eight feet
from the suspect, and had their flashlights trained on him.
They repeatedly ordered the suspect to show his hands and to
freeze. Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo had their guns drawn
and pointed at the suspect. Although facing the officers, the
suspect’s body was not square. He was standing at an angle,
with his right shoulder forward. His left hand was positioned
above his forehead (apparently to shield his eyes from the
light), while his right hand was tucked into the left side of his
waistband and appeared to be clutching an object.
Suddenly, the suspect pulled his right hand out of his
waistband, not as if he were surrendering, but quickly and as
if he were drawing a pistol. As the suspect made the sudden
movement, Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo opened fire. As the
first shots were fired, Carson’s flashlight was hit by a
projectile (later determined to be a ricochet from one of the
troopers’ shots), and he fell to the ground. Swanson went to
his aid, and after determining that he was unwounded, helped
him up. Meanwhile, Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo continued
firing at the suspect. At some point, the suspect turned away
from the officers, yet they kept firing, shooting him in the
legs and buttocks. The suspect finally fell to the ground,
landing on his stomach and facing away from the officers.
5

Swanson approached the suspect and determined that he had
no pulse. He was later pronounced dead.
In all, Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo fired
continuously for ten seconds, shooting a total of 39 rounds.
Modarelli and Moyer each fired 14 shots (thus emptying their
magazines), and Manzo fired 11 times. Eighteen bullets
struck the suspect, and 11 hit him from behind. A medical
examiner identified two bullets that were likely fatal, both of
which struck the suspect in the chest. The examiner could
not, however, determine when during the course of the
shooting the fatal bullets hit the suspect.
The suspect was later determined to be Eric Quick. It
turned out that Quick did not have a gun in his right hand; he
held only a crack pipe. The pipe was shaped like a
cigarette—two inches long, cylindrical, and clear.
A
toxicology report suggests that Quick was under the influence
of cocaine and heroin at the time of the incident.
II
The plaintiff is the administrator ad prosequendum of
Quick’s estate. On April 14, 2004, she filed this lawsuit in
state court. In relevant part, the complaint asserts Fourth
Amendment excessive-force claims against Modarelli,
Moyer, and Manzo. The troopers removed the case to the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on
May 27, 2004. In 2005, the case was stayed pending the
outcome of a grand jury investigation into the troopers’
conduct. The grand jury ultimately declined to indict the
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troopers, and the case was resumed. On May 22, 2008, the
troopers moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense
of qualified immunity.
The District Court granted the motion on February 25,
2009. The Court first rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
the use of force was necessarily unreasonable because the
troopers’ decision to pursue Quick into the woods—rather
than set up a perimeter and use a K-9 to flush him out—was
unreasonable.
This argument lacks merit, the Court
explained, because “the act that presumably justified the use
of deadly force was not the [troopers]’, but rather Quick’s.
The troopers did not resort to deadly force until Quick
suddenly ripped his right hand from his waistband.” JA 15.
The Court next concluded that Quick’s sudden, threatening
movement justified the troopers’ initial use of deadly force.
Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that there
is a triable issue on whether the use of force, even if initially
justified, became unreasonable as the events transpired. The
Court opined, “When Quick made a sudden movement and
ripped his right hand from his left waistband, the troopers,
believing Quick had a gun, all fired at the same time and
stopped once Quick was no longer a threat.” Id. at 22. The
Court acknowledged that “the number of bullets fired appears
‘excessive’ in laymen’s terms,” but stressed that “[t]here is no
evidence that any of the troopers fired mindlessly or paused
and then resumed firing after Quick was on the ground facedown.” Id. at 22–23. The Court explained further that,
although “eleven bullets struck Quick in the posterior of his
body[,]” this “does not, standing alone, show that” the
troopers continued firing after “Quick was no longer a
7

threat.” Id. at 22 n.14.
The plaintiff appealed.
III
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 and 1343. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291. Our review of a district court’s grant of summary
judgment is plenary. Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d
279, 285 (3d Cir. 2008).
IV
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Facts that could
affect the outcome are “material facts,” and a dispute about a
material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is sufficient to
permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23
(1986).
Because “the victim of deadly force is unable to
testify,” Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir. 1999),
we have recognized that a court ruling on summary judgment
in a deadly-force case “should be cautious . . . to ‘ensure that
the officer[s are] not taking advantage of the fact that the
8

witness most likely to contradict [their] story—the person
shot dead—is unable to testify,’” id. (quoting Scott v.
Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)). Thus, a court
should avoid simply accepting “‘what may be a selfserving
account by the officer[s].
It must also look at the
circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to
discredit the police officer[s’] story, and consider whether this
evidence could convince a rational fact finder that the
officer[s] acted unreasonably.’” Id. (quoting Scott, 39 F.3d at
915).
This is not to say that the summary judgment standard
should be applied with extra rigor in deadly-force cases. Rule
56 contains no separate provision governing summary
judgment in such cases. Cf. Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics,
Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). Just as in a run-ofthe-mill civil action, the party opposing summary judgment in
a deadly-force case must point to evidence—whether direct or
circumstantial—that creates a genuine issue of material fact,
“and may not rely simply on the assertion that a reasonable
jury could discredit the opponent[s’] account.” Estate of
Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 2003); see
Thompson v. Hubbard, 257 F.3d 896, 899–900 (8th Cir.
2001); Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 644 (4th Cir. 1996);
Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460–61 (3d
Cir. 1989). Our conclusion on this score is reinforced by
decisions refusing to ratchet up the summary judgment
standard for other types of cases. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at
256–57 (defamation cases requiring a showing of malice);
Wallace, 103 F.3d at 1396 (employment-discrimination
cases); Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Medina, 834 F.2d 242, 247 (1st
9

Cir. 1987) (antitrust cases); see also Gordon v. United
Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 896 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting) (“[Rule 56 prescribes] a universally applicable
standard; there is no room for a thumb on the scale against
summary judgment in any class of cases.”).
V
The District Court held that the troopers were entitled
to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment excessiveforce claims. Government officials performing discretionary
functions are immune “from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982). To determine whether an officer is qualifiedly
immune from suit, we ask (1) whether the officer violated a
constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly
established, such that “it would [have been] clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–
02 (2001); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987) (holding that, for purposes of the second question, the
right must have been clearly established in a particularized
sense, such that “a reasonable official would [have
understood] that what he [wa]s doing violate[d] that right”).
Although we have discretion to tackle the “clearly
established” issue first, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808,
818 (2009), we will begin with the question whether the
troopers violated Quick’s Fourth Amendment rights.
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A
The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable .
. . seizures.” To prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessiveforce claim, a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and
that it was unreasonable under the circumstances. Brower v.
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989); Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1989). There is no dispute
that the troopers “seized” Quick when they shot and killed
him. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (holding
that “apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure”).
The question, instead, is whether the seizure was
unreasonable.
It is unreasonable for an officer to use deadly force
against a suspect unless the officer has good reason “to
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or
serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Garner, 471
U.S. at 3. In determining whether this standard was violated,
we must remember that law enforcement officers “are often
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Thus, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a
particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene”; Monday morning
quarterbacking is not allowed. Id. at 396; see also Brown v.
United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.)
(“Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of
an uplifted knife.”). Under this “standard of reasonableness
11

at the moment,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, an officer who
uses deadly force in the mistaken belief that a suspect is
armed will be forgiven so long as the mistake is reasonable
and the circumstances otherwise justify the use of such force.
See id. at 396; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205; Curley v. Klem, 298
F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2002).
In this case, the troopers were advised that local police
were driving down the interstate in pursuit of a suspected car
thief, later determined to be Quick. Car theft is a relatively
serious (though not inherently violent) offense. When the
troopers arrived at the scene, they were told that Quick had
fled into the dark, thicket-filled woods bordering the
interstate. Once in the woods, Modarelli happened upon
Quick and ordered him to show his hands and surrender.
Quick fled. When they encountered Quick again, the troopers
repeatedly ordered him to show his hands and to freeze.
Quick refused to comply. Instead, he stood with his right
hand concealed in his waistband, apparently clutching an
object. He then suddenly pulled his right hand out of his
waistband—a movement uniformly described by those on the
scene as being similar to that of drawing a gun. At that point,
the troopers were justified in opening fire. “An officer is not
constitutionally required to wait until he sets eyes upon [a]
weapon before employing deadly force to protect himself
against a fleeing suspect who . . . moves as though to draw a
gun.” Thompson, 257 F.3d at 899. Waiting in such
circumstances could well prove fatal. Police officers do not
enter into a suicide pact when they take an oath to uphold the
Constitution. See also Krueger v. Fuhr, 991 F.2d 435, 439
(8th Cir. 1993) (shooting was reasonable where, during a foot
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chase of an armed assault suspect, the suspect suddenly
reached into his waistband despite having been ordered to
freeze); Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 500–01 (5th Cir.
1991) (shooting was reasonable where officers approached
the vehicle of a robbery suspect and, after being ordered to
show his hands, the suspect reached under his seat multiple
times).
To be sure, the plaintiff’s brief suggests that Quick
was simply complying with the order that he show his hands
when he pulled his hand out of his waistband. See Pl.’s Br. at
10. But, as the plaintiff seemed to acknowledge at oral
argument, the undisputed evidence shows that Quick pulled
his hand out of his waistband, not as if he were surrendering,
but abruptly and as though he were drawing a pistol. Given
the state of the record, we are compelled to hold that the
troopers reasonably believed that Quick was drawing a gun,
not complying with their command that he show his hands.
B
The plaintiff argues that there is a triable issue on
whether the troopers’ continued use of force, even if initially
justified, became excessive as the events unfolded. We agree.
Even where an officer is initially justified in using force, he
may not continue to use such force after it has become
evident that the threat justifying the force has vanished. See
Lytle v. Bexar County, Tex., 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir.
2009) (observing that “an exercise of force that is reasonable
at one moment can become unreasonable in the next if the
justification for the use of force has ceased”); Waterman v.
13

Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 481 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[F]orce justified
at the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds
later if the justification for the initial force has been
eliminated.”); Abraham, 183 F.3d at 294 (“A passing risk to a
police officer is not an ongoing license to kill an otherwise
unthreatening suspect.”); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247
(7th Cir. 1993) (“When an officer faces a situation in which
he could justifiably shoot, he does not retain the right to shoot
at any time thereafter with impunity.”).
Here, the troopers opened fire as Quick yanked his
right hand out of his waistband. At that point, the troopers
reasonably believed that Quick was pulling a gun on them.
But after Quick made this sudden movement, his right hand
was visible to the troopers, who were standing between five
and eight feet away and had their flashlights trained on him.
(Indeed, Modarelli has stated that he could see Quick’s right
hand while firing his weapon.) Although Quick’s weaponless
right hand was fully visible immediately after the troopers
began firing, the troopers continued to fire for roughly 10
seconds, shooting a total of 39 rounds. On these facts, a
reasonable jury could conclude that the troopers should have
recognized that Quick was unarmed and stopped firing
sooner.
We have not overlooked the fact that, just as the
troopers began firing, Carson’s flashlight was struck by a
projectile, causing him to fall to the ground. We assume that
the troopers could reasonably have believed that the flashlight
was hit by return fire, thus justifying the further use of deadly
force. But the evidence shows that the flashlight was hit as
14

the first shots were fired. In our view, a jury could find that
the troopers should have realized that Quick did not have a
weapon some time thereafter and ceased fire.
We are, moreover, concerned by the fact that 11 of the
18 bullets that struck Quick hit him from behind. The
troopers try to explain this by saying that Quick spun around
and fell to the ground as the final shots were fired. Frankly,
this explanation sounds a bit far-fetched. If the troopers’
account were accurate, one might expect to discover that a
small number of bullets hit Quick from behind. In fact, more
than half of the 18 bullets that struck Quick hit him from
behind. In these circumstances, a jury may find that the
troopers improperly continued firing after Quick had turned
away from them and no longer posed a threat. See Bing v.
City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2006); Carr
v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2003); Gardner
v. Buerger, 82 F.3d 248, 253–54 (8th Cir. 1996); Ellis, 999
F.2d at 247; Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1332–
33 (11th Cir. 1988).2
Having determined that a jury could find that the
troopers’ use of force reached excessive proportions, we now
move to the second qualified immunity question: whether the
right at issue was clearly established. See Saucier, 533 U.S.
at 201. We conclude that it was. As explained, the evidence
2

On the current record, the timing of the fatal shots is unknown, so
the troopers have not suggested that Quick had already died by the
time any excessive shots were fired.
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would permit the conclusion that the troopers continued firing
at Quick after a reasonable officer would have realized that he
did not pose a serious threat and stopped shooting. Assuming
(as we must) that this view of the evidence is the one that
ultimately will prevail, the troopers clearly are not entitled to
qualified immunity. It has long been the law that an officer
may not use deadly force against a suspect unless the officer
reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious
bodily injury to the officer or others. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3,
11; Abraham, 183 F.3d at 294. In short, the dispute in this
case is about the facts, not the law. The doctrine of qualified
immunity is therefore inapposite. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at
205 (qualified immunity excuses reasonable “mistake[s] as to
what the law requires”).
C
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the troopers’ decision
to pursue Quick into the woods violated standard police
procedures and was unreasonable. According to a police
expert retained by the plaintiff, the troopers should have set
up a perimeter around the woods and used a K-9 to flush
Quick out.
If the decision to enter the woods was
unreasonable, the plaintiff reasons, then any force employed
once in the woods was necessarily unreasonable, too, because
the force would not have been used had the troopers not gone
into the woods. We reject this argument, as it is premised on
a flawed understanding of the doctrine of proximate
causation.
Like a tort plaintiff, a § 1983 plaintiff must establish
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both causation in fact and proximate causation. See Brower,
489 U.S. at 599; Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285
(1980); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000);
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
A superseding cause breaks the chain of proximate causation.
Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1993); Warner
v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1071 (2d Cir.
1997) (noting that “in cases brought under § 1983 a
superseding cause, as traditionally understood in common law
tort doctrine, will relieve a defendant of liability”); Hector v.
Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2000) (Nygaard, J.,
concurring) (observing, in a § 1983 case, that the “causal
chain traced by a proximate cause analysis can be broken by a
. . . superseding cause”); see generally Restatement (Second)
of Torts §§ 440–453 (1965).
In Bodine, for example, police officers entered the
plaintiff’s home to arrest him. According to the officers, the
plaintiff reacted violently, thus requiring them to use force to
effect the arrest. 72 F.3d at 395. The district court held that
the officers’ entry into the plaintiff’s home was unreasonable
and violated the Fourth Amendment. Having so concluded,
the court held that any force used once in the home, even if
ostensibly justified, was necessarily unreasonable. Id. at 395–
96. We disagreed with this analysis, explaining that it
misapplied the doctrines of proximate and superseding
causation.
To illustrate, then-Judge Alito offered the
following hypothetical, which is instructive here:
Suppose that three police officers go to a
suspect’s house to execute an arrest warrant and
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that they [enter illegally.] Once inside, they
encounter the suspect, identify themselves,
show him the warrant, and tell him that they are
placing him under arrest.
The suspect,
however, breaks away, shoots and kills two of
the officers, and is preparing to shoot the third
officer when that officer disarms the suspect
and in the process injures him. Is the third
officer necessarily liable for the harm caused to
the suspect on the theory that the illegal entry . .
. rendered any subsequent use of force
unlawful? The obvious answer is “no.” . . . .
The suspect’s conduct would constitute a
“superseding” cause . . . that would limit the
officer’s liability.
Id. at 400. In other words, as long as “the officer[’s] use of
force was reasonable given the plaintiff’s acts, then despite
the illegal entry, the plaintiff’s own conduct would be a
[superseding] cause that limited the officer[’s] liability.”
Hector, 235 F.3d at 160 (describing Bodine); see also
Brower, 489 U.S. at 599; Young v. City of Killeen, Tex., 775
F.2d 1349, 1352–53 (5th Cir. 1985). But see Espinosa v. City
and Cnty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 538–39 (9th Cir.
2010).
The D.C. Circuit engaged in a similar analysis in
Hundley v. District of Columbia, 494 F.3d 1097 (D.C. Cir.
2007). There, an off-duty police officer observed two people
having sex inside a parked car. The officer tapped on the
window of the car as he walked past. Irritated, the driver
18

attempted to run the officer over. The officer jumped out of
the way, drew his gun, and ordered the occupants out. Once
outside, the driver made a threatening movement towards the
officer, whereupon the officer shot and killed him. 494 F.3d
at 1099–1100. In the ensuing civil suit, the plaintiff advanced
the theory that, if the officer had acted unreasonably in
initiating the encounter, the officer was necessarily liable for
the shooting, regardless of whether it was done in selfdefense. The D.C. Circuit rejected this theory, holding that
the suspect’s threatening movement was a superseding cause
that broke the causal chain between the initial stop and the
shooting. Id. at 1104–05 & n.5.
Based on Bodine and Hundley, we conclude that the
troopers’ decision to enter the woods did not proximately
cause Quick’s death.
Rather, Quick’s noncompliant,
threatening conduct in the woods was a superseding cause
that served to break the chain of causation between the entry
and the shooting. Holding otherwise would, as noted in
Hundley, tend to deter police officers “from approaching and
detaining potentially violent suspects.” 494 F.3d at 1105.
VI
The District Court correctly determined that the
troopers’ initial use of deadly force was permissible. But the
Court erred in ruling for the troopers on the plaintiff’s claim
that the force became excessive as the events transpired. It
may be that the troopers were justified in their use of force at
all times, but it will be up to a jury to make that decision. The
District Court’s judgment will be affirmed in part and
19

reversed in part, and the case will be remanded for further
proceedings.

20

